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Abstract 
Grid computing is concerned with the sharing and 
coordinated use of diverse resources in distributed "virtual 
organizations.” The dynamic and multi-institutional nature 
of these environments introduces challenging security 
issues that demand new technical approaches. In 
particular, one must deal with diverse local mechanisms, 
support dynamic creation of services, and enable dynamic 
creation of trust domains. We describe how these issues 
are addressed in two generations of the Globus Toolkit®. 
First, we review the Globus Toolkit version 2 (GT2) 
approach; then, we describe new approaches developed to 
support the Globus Toolkit version 3 (GT3) 
implementation of the Open Grid Services Architecture, an 
initiative that is recasting Grid concepts within a service-
oriented framework based on Web services. GT3’s security 
implementation uses Web services security mechanisms for 
credential exchange and other purposes, and introduces a 
tight least-privilege model that avoids the need for any 
privileged network service. 
1 Introduction 
The term “Grid” refers to systems and applications 
that integrate and manage resources and services 
distributed across multiple control domains [12]. Pioneered 
in an e-science context, Grid technologies are also 
generating interest in industry, as a result of their apparent 
relevance to commercial distributed-computing 
applications [14]. 
A common scenario within Grid computing involves 
the formation of dynamic “virtual organizations” (VOs) 
[16] comprising groups of individuals and associated 
resources and services united by a common purpose but 
not located within a single administrative domain. The 
need to support the integration and management of 
resources within VOs introduces challenging security 
issues [15]. For a variety of issues relating to certification, 
group membership, authorization, and the like, the 
relationships among participants in VOs represent an 
overlay with respect to the relationships existing between 
those participants and their parent organizations. This 
overlay exists both in terms of trust and with respect to the 
security mechanisms and policies in place at those parent 
organizations. 
Grid computing research has produced security 
technologies based not on direct interorganizational trust 
relationships but rather on the use of the VO as a bridge 
among the entities participating in a particular community 
or function. The results of this research have been 
incorporated into a widely used software system called the 
Globus Toolkit®1 (GT) [4] that uses public key 
technologies to address issues of single sign-on, delegation 
[17], and identity mapping, while supporting standardized 
APIs such as GSS-API [23]. The Grid Security 
Infrastructure (GSI) is the name given to the portion of the 
Globus Toolkit that implements security functionality. 
The recent definition of the Open Grid Services 
Infrastructure specification and other elements of the Open 
Grid Services Architecture (OGSA) [14] within the Global 
Grid Forum introduces new challenges and opportunities 
for Grid security. In particular, integration with Web 
services and hosting environment technologies introduces 
opportunities to leverage emerging security standards and 
technologies such as the Security Assertion Markup 
Language (SAML) [32] and Web services security. 
Integration of GSI with OGSA enables the use of Web 
services techniques to express and publish policy [2], 
allowing applications to determine automatically what 
security policies and mechanisms are required of them. 
Implementing security in the form of OGSA services 
allows those services to be used as needed by applications 
to meet these requirements. Advanced hosting 
environments enable security functionality to be 
implemented outside of the application, simplifying 
development. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. 
In Sections 2 and 3, we review Grid security challenges 
and GT2 security mechanisms. In Sections 4 and 5, we 
introduce our view of an OGSA security model and our 
GT3 implementation. We conclude in Section 6 with a 
brief discussion of future work. 
2 Grid Security Challenges 
Security requirements within the Grid environment are 
driven by the need to support scalable, dynamic, 
distributed virtual organizations (VOs) [16]—collections 
of diverse and distributed individuals that seek to share and 
use diverse resources in a coordinated fashion. From a 
security perspective, a key attribute of VOs is that 
participants and resources are governed by the rules and 
policies of the classical organizations of which they are 
members. Furthermore, while some VOs, such as multiyear 
scientific collaborations, may be large and long-lived (in 
which case explicit negotiations with resource providers 
are acceptable), others will be short-lived—created, 
perhaps, to support a single task, for example, two 
individuals sharing documents and data as they write a 
proposal—in which case overheads associated with VO 
creation and operation have to be small. 
A fundamental requirement is thus to enable VO 
access to resources that exist within classical organizations 
and that, from the perspective of those classical 
organizations, have policies in place that speak only about 
local users. This VO access must be established and 
coordinated only through binary trust relationships that 
exist between (a) the local user and their organization and 
(b) the VO and the user. We cannot, in general, assume 
trust relationships between the classical organization and 
the VO or its external members. 
Grid security mechanisms address these challenges by 
allowing a VO to be treated as a policy domain overlay as 
shown in Figure 1. Multiple resources or organizations 
outsource certain policy control(s) to a third party, the VO, 
which coordinates the outsourced policy in a consistent 
manner to allow for coordinated resource sharing and use. 
Complicating Grid security is the fact that new 
services (i.e., resources) may be deployed and instantiated 
dynamically over a VO’s lifetime. For example, a user may 
establish personal stateful interfaces to existing resources, 
or the VO itself may create directory services to keep track 
of VO participants. Like their static counterparts, these 
resources must be securely coordinated and must interact 
with other services. 
This combination of dynamic policy overlays and 
dynamically created entities drives the need for three key 
functions in a Grid security model. 
1. Multiple security mechanisms. Organizations 
participating in a VO often have significant 
investment in existing security mechanisms and 
infrastructure. Grid security must interoperate 
with, rather than replace, those mechanisms. 
2. Dynamic creation of services. Users must be able 
to create new services (e.g., “resources”) 
dynamically without administrator intervention. 
These services must be coordinated and must 
interact securely with other services. Thus, we 
must be able to name the service with an 
assertable identity and to grant rights to that 
identity without contradicting the governing local 
policy. 
3. Dynamic establishment of trust domains. In order 
to coordinate resources, VOs need to establish 
trust among not only users and resources in the 
VO but also among the VO’s resources, so that 
they can be coordinated. These trust domains can 
span multiple organizations and must adapt 
dynamically as participants join, are created, or 
leave the VO. 
Traditional means of security administration that 
involve manual editing of policy databases or issuance of 
credentials cannot meet the demands of these dynamic 
scenarios. We require a user-driven security model that 
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Figure 1. A virtual organization policy domain 
overlay pulls together participants from 
disparate domains into a common trust 
domain. 
allows users to create entities and policy domains in order 
to create and coordinate resources within VOs.  
3  GT2 Grid Security Model  
To set the stage for our discussion of OGSA and GT3 
security, we review briefly the security technologies 
incorporated in the Globus Toolkit version 2 (GT2) [13] 
and explain how these technologies address the three key 
issues introduced above. GT2 includes services for Grid 
Resource Allocation and Management (GRAM), 
Monitoring and Discovery (MDS), and data movement 
(GridFTP). These services use a common Grid Security 
Infrastructure (GSI) [4, 15] to provide security 
functionality. 
Diverse site security mechanisms. GSI defines a 
common credential format based on X.509 identity 
certificates [5, 28] and a common protocol based on 
transport layer security (TLS [10], SSL [18]). An X.509 
certificate, in conjunction with an associated private key, 
forms a unique credential set that a Grid entity (service or 
user) uses to authenticate itself to other Grid entities; the 
TLS-based protocol is used to perform authentication and 
then provide message protection (encryption, integrity 
checking), as desired, on the subsequent data stream. 
Gateways are used to translate between this common GSI 
infrastructure and local site mechanisms. For example, the 
Kerberos Certificate Authority (KCA) [29] and 
SSLK5/PKINIT provide translation from Kerberos to GSI 
and vice versa, respectively. These mechanisms allow a 
site with an existing Kerberos infrastructure to continue 
using that installation and convert credentials between 
Kerberos and GSI as needed. 
Each GSI certificate is issued by a trusted party known 
as a certificate authority (CA), usually run by a large 
organization or commercial company. In order to trust the 
X.509 certificate presented by an entity, one must trust the 
CA that issued the certificate. We chose to use X.509 
identity certificates within GSI because establishment of 
this trust is relatively lightweight. In contrast to 
mechanisms such as Kerberos [25], where inter-
institutional trust requires a bilateral agreement at the 
organizational level, trust in a CA can be established 
unilaterally: A single entity in an organization can decide 
to trust any CA, without necessarily involving the 
organization as a whole. This feature is key to the 
establishment of VOs that involve only some portion of an 
organization, where the organization as a whole may 
provide little or no support for the VO. 
Dynamic creation of entities and the granting of 
privileges to those entities. GSI introduces X.509 proxy 
certificates, a GSI extension to X.509 identity certificates 
[28] that allow a user to assign dynamically a new X.509 
identity to an entity and then delegate some subset of their 
rights to that identity. Users create a proxy certificate by 
issuing a new X.509 certificate signed using their own 
credentials instead of involving a CA. This mechanism 
allows new credentials and identities to be created quickly 
without the involvement of a traditional administrator. 
Dynamic creation and management of overlaid trust 
domains. The requirement for overlaid trust domains to 
establish VOs is satisfied by GSI using both proxy 
certificates and security services such as the Community 
Authorization Service (CAS) [26]. GSI has an implicit 
policy that any two entities bearing proxy certificates 
issued by the same user will inherently trust each other. 
This policy allows users to create trust domains 
dynamically by issuing proxy certificates to any services 
that they wish to have collaborate. 
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Figure 2. CAS allows VOs to express policy, and 
it allows resources to apply policy that is a 
subset of VO and local policy. 
The implicit policy of trust between proxy holders 
allows for the lightweight, dynamic creation of simple trust 
domains but has limitations when it comes to complicated 
trust domains with, for example, limited trust between 
multiple parties. In that latter case, we can turn to security 
services such as CAS that allow flexible, expressive policy 
to be created regarding multiple users in a VO. CAS allows 
a VO to express the policy that has been outsourced to it by 
the resource providers in the VO. This process, as 
illustrated in Figure 2, comprises three steps: 
1. The user authenticates to CAS and receives 
assertions from CAS expressing the VO’s policy 
in terms of how that user may use VO resources. 
2. The user then presents the assertion to a VO 
resource along with the usage request. 
3. In evaluating whether to allow the request, the 
resource checks both local policy and the VO 
policy expressed in the CAS assertion. 
CAS allows a resource to remain the ultimate 
authority over that resource, but it also allows the VO to 
control a subset of that enforced policy. In turn, the VO 
can coordinate the policy across a number of resources to 
control the sharing of those resources by the VO. 
In designing GSI we evaluated several related efforts 
before electing to build on PKI. We noted the following 
shortcomings in other approaches with respect to Grid 
security requirements: 
• Kerberos [25] requires the explicit involvement 
of site administrators to establish interdomain 
trust relationships or to create new entities. 
• The CRISIS wide area security system [3] 
defines a uniform and scalable security 
infrastructure for wide area systems but does not 
address interoperability with local security 
mechanisms. 
• Secure SHell (SSH) [30] provides a strong 
system of authentication and message protection 
but has no support for translation between 
different mechanisms or for creation of dynamic 
entities. 
• The Legion security model [19] is perhaps the 
most similar to that of GT2, using X.509 
certificates for delegation. However, it lacks 
mechanisms for creation of dynamic entities. 
4 The GT3 Security Model for OGSA 
We now turn to the question of how Grid security 
challenges can be addressed within the context of the Open 
Grid Services Architecture (OGSA) [14], a set of technical 
specifications that align Grid technologies with emerging 
Web services technologies [18].  
Web services technologies allow software components 
to be defined in terms of access methods, bindings of these 
methods to specific communication mechanisms, and 
mechanisms for discovering relevant services. While 
particular mechanisms and methods are not prescribed, 
some mechanisms are emerging as ubiquitous. In 
particular, the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) [1] 
provides a means of messaging using XML envelopes to 
encapsulate payloads, with HTTP the most commonly used 
underlying protocol. Another example is the Web Services 
Description Language (WSDL) [7], which provides a 
method for expressing operation signatures and bindings to 
protocols and endpoints in an XML document (groups of 
operations bundled together to form a “Web service”). 
OGSA defines standard Web service interfaces and 
behaviors that add to Web services the concepts of stateful 
services and secure invocation, as well as other capabilities 
needed to address Grid-specific requirements that are not 
relevant for this paper. These interfaces and behaviors 
define what is called a “Grid service” and allow users to 
manage the Grid service’s life-cycle, as allowed by policy, 
and to create sophisticated distributed services. Grid 
services can define, as part of their interface, service data 
elements (SDEs) that other entities can (again, subject to 
policy) query or subscribe to.  
OGSA introduces both new opportunities and new 
challenges for Grid security. Emerging Web services 
security specifications address the expression of Web 
service security policy (WS-Policy [2], XACML [33]), 
standard formats for security token exchange (WS-Security 
[22], SAML [32]), and standard methods for authentication 
and establishment of security contexts and trust 
relationships (WS-SecureConversation [20], WS-Trust 
[21]). These specifications may be exploited to create 
standard, interoperable methods for these features in Grid 
security. But they may, in some cases, also need to be 
extended to address the Grid security requirements listed 
above. 
Version 3 of the Globus Toolkit (GT3) and its 
accompanying Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI3) provide 
the first implementation of OGSA mechanisms. GT3’s 
security model seeks to allow applications and users to 
operate on the Grid in as seamless and automated a manner 
as possible. Security mechanisms should not have to be 
instantiated in an application but instead should be 
supplied by the surrounding Grid infrastructure, allowing 
the infrastructure to adapt on behalf of the application to 
meet the application's requirements. The application should 
need to deal with only application-specific policy. GT3 
uses the following powerful features of OGSA and Web 
services security to work toward this goal: 
1. Casts security functionality as OGSA services to 
allow them to be located and used as needed by 
applications. 
2. Uses sophisticated hosting environments to handle 
security for applications and allow security to 
adapt without having to change the application. 
3. Publishes service security policy so that clients 
can discover dynamically what credentials and 
mechanisms are needed to establish trust with the 
service. 
4. Specifies standards for the exchange of security 
tokens to allow for interoperability. 
In the following subsections we describe how each of 
these features is used in our GT3 OGSA security model. 
We then explain how they are used together to support 
seamless Grid security. We emphasize that what we 
describe here is our own GT3 OGSA security model, that 
is, an OGSA-based security model that we (the Globus 
Project security team) have defined and implemented 
within GT3. Ultimately, we hope that an appropriate 
standards body (e.g., the Global Grid Forum) will define 
the OGSA security model, which may or may not 
incorporate some of the ideas presented here. 
4.1 Security as Services 
Secure operation in a Grid environment requires that 
applications and services be capable of supporting a variety 
of security functionality, such as authentication, 
authorization, credential conversion, auditing, and 
delegation. Grid applications need to interact with other 
applications and services that have a range of security 
mechanisms and requirements. These mechanisms and 
requirements are likely to evolve over time as new 
mechanisms are developed or policies change. Grid 
applications must avoid embedding security mechanisms 
statically in order to adapt to changing requirements. 
Our OGSA security model casts security functions as 
OGSA services. This strategy allows well-defined 
protocols and interfaces to be defined for these services 
and permits an application to outsource security 
functionality by using a security service with a particular 
implementation to fit its current need. 
A draft OGSA Security Roadmap [31] presented in 
2002 to the Global Grid Forum itemizes numerous security 
services, including the following. 
• Credential processing service: A service that 
handles the details of processing and validating 
authentication tokens 
• Authorization service: A service that evaluates 
policy rules regarding the decision to allow the 
attempted actions based on information about the 
requestor (identity, attributes, etc.), the target 
(identity, policy, attributes, etc.), and details of the 
request. 
• Credential Conversion service: A service that 
enables bridging of different trust or mechanism 
domains by converting credentials between trust 
roots or mechanisms. 
• Identity Mapping service: A service that takes a 
user's identity in one domain and returns the 
identity in another (e.g., given the user's X.509 
identity, it could return the Kerberos principal 
name). 
• Audit: A service that securely logs relevant 
information about events. 
4.2 Hosting Environment 
It is not a trivial task to find and use security services 
such as those described in the preceding section: in fact, it 
can require considerable sophistication on the part of the 
application. Ideally, application developers should not be 
burdened with the details of this process. 
Grid services, like the Web services they leverage, 
may be built on sophisticated container-based hosting 
environments such as J2EE or .Net. These hosting 
environments provide a high level of functionality and 
allow for much security implementation complexity to be 
pulled from applications. We envision that most security 
functionality will be placed in hosting environments, 
simplifying application development and allowing security 
functionality to be upgraded independently of applications. 
4.3 Publishing of Security Policy 
In order to establish trust, two entities need to be able 
to find a common set of security mechanisms that both 
understand. The use of hosting environments and security 
services, as described previously, enables OGSA 
applications and services to adapt dynamically and use 
different security mechanisms. However, an application 
can select the proper security mechanisms and credentials 
only if it knows what mechanisms and credentials are 
acceptable to the service with which it wishes to interact. 
The WS-Policy [2] specification and its related 
specifications define how a Web service can publish its 
security policy along with its interface specification as part 
of a WSDL document. Such a published policy can express 
requirements for mechanisms, acceptable trust roots, token 
formats, and other security parameters. An application 
wishing to interact with the service can examine this 
published policy and gather the needed credentials and 
functionality by contacting appropriate OGSA security 
services. 
4.4 Specified Format for Security Tokens 
The WS-Security [22], WS-SecureConversation [20], 
and WS-Trust [21] specifications contain conventions and 
formats for the communication of various mechanism-
specific tokens (e.g., Kerberos tickets and X.509 
certificates) inside SOAP envelopes. This enveloping 
standardizes the protocol for security mechanisms and 
allows mechanisms to be independent of any application 
protocol. Hosting environments can recognize security-
related messages and route them to an appropriate service 
for handling, and entities in the network can recognize 
whether and how an interaction is secured. For example, a 
firewall can recognize whether a connection is 
authenticated and allow only authenticated connections. 
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Figure 3. Example of a secured request in the OGSA security 
 model. The steps are described in the text.
4.5 The GT3 OGSA Security Model in Action 
Figure 3 shows a simplified example of the GT3 
OGSA security model in action. A request is made by the 
OGSA client on the left to the OGSA service on the right. 
Both client and service are contained in advanced hosting 
environments (Section 4.2) that handle all security 
functionality for their respective contained application and 
service. For simplicity many details of the security process, 
such as auditing, client-side authorization, and privacy are 
omitted. These functions would be implemented similarly, 
with the hosting environments using OGSA services to 
provide the needed functionality. 
The client first forms a request intended for the OGSA 
service and passes the request to its hosting environment 
for processing and delivery. The following steps are taken 
to handle the security of the request: 
1. The client’s hosting environment retrieves and 
inspects the security policy of the target service to 
determine what mechanisms and credentials are 
required to submit a request. 
2. If the client’s hosting environment determines that 
the needed credentials are not already present, it 
contacts a credential conversion service to convert 
existing credentials to the needed format, 
mechanism, and/or trust root. Two examples of 
such services are CAS [26], for translating the 
user’s personal credential to a VO credential, and 
KCA [29], for converting between Kerberos and 
PKI mechanisms. 
3. The client’s hosting environment uses a token 
processing and validation service (e.g., XKMS 
[11]) to handle the formatting and processing of 
authentication tokens for exchange with the target 
service. This service relieves the application and 
its hosting environment from having to 
understand the details of any particular 
mechanism.  
4. On the server side, the hosting environment 
likewise uses a token processing service to 
process the authentication tokens presented by the 
client. (In the example, both use the same service, 
but each could use a separate service.) 
5. After authentication and the determination of 
client identity and attributes, the target service’s 
hosting environment presents the details of the 
request and client information to an authorization 
service (e.g., PERMIS [6] or Akenti [27]) for a 
policy decision. 
 
If all these steps complete successfully, the target 
service’s hosting environment then presents the authorized 
request to the target service application. The application, 
knowing that the hosting environment has already taken 
care of security, can focus on application-specific request 
processing steps. 
5 GT3 Security Implementation 
The Grid Security Infrastructure version 3 (GSI3) of 
the Globus Toolkit version 3 is an initial implementation of 
key components of the OGSA security model described in 
Section 4. This implementation has two key advantages 
over its GT2 predecessor described in Section 3: 
• Use of WS-Security protocols and standards. GT3 
uses SOAP and the Web services security 
specifications for all of its communications. This 
allows it to leverage and use standard current and 
future Web service tools and software. 
• Tight least-privilege model. In contrast to GT2, 
the GT3 resource management implementation 
uses no privileged services. All privileged code is 
contained in two small, tightly constrained setuid 
programs. 
We describe here how these two advantages are 
implemented in GT3 and describes the GT3 Grid Resource 
Acquisition and Management (GRAM) system, which 
illustrates all key GSI3 components. 
5.1 Use of Web Services Security and Protocol 
GT3 uses Web services specifications to allow 
security messages and secured messages to be transported, 
understood, and manipulated by standard Web services 
tools and software. GT3 offers both stateful and stateless 
forms of secured communication. 
Stateful. Like GT2, GSI3 supports the establishment of 
a security context that serves to authenticate two parties to 
each other and allows for the exchange of secured 
messages between the two parties. GT2 uses the TLS [10] 
transport protocol for both security context establishment 
and message protection. Our GT3 implementation achieves 
security context establishment by implementing WS-
SecureConversation [20] and WS-Trust [21], which use 
SOAP messages to transport context-establishment tokens 
between the two parties. The GT3 messages carry the same 
context establishment tokens used by GT2 but transports 
them over SOAP instead of TCP. Once the security context 
is established, GSI3 implements message protection using 
the Web services standards for secured messages (XML-
Signature [34] and XML-Encryption [35]). 
Stateless. To allow for communication without the 
initial establishment of a security context, GT3 also offers 
the ability to sign messages independent of any established 
security context, by using the XML-Signature 
specification. Thus, a message can be created and signed, 
allowing the recipient to verify the message’s origin and 
integrity, without establishing synchronous communication 
with the recipient. A feature of this approach is that the 
identity of the recipient does not have to be known to the 
sender when the message is sent. As we discuss later, this 
allows for messages to be created by clients and delivered 
to services whose creation is caused by the message itself. 
5.2 Tight Least-Privilege Model 
“Least privilege” is a well-known principle in 
computer security that states that each entity should only 
have the minimal privilege needed to accomplish its 
assigned role and no more. GT3 introduces two notable 
features that improve its security through the least privilege 
principle. 
No privileged services. Network services, since they 
accept and process communications from outside the 
resource, are prone to compromise by remote users through 
logic errors, buffer overflows, and the like. GT3 removes 
all privileges from these services, significantly reducing 
the impact of compromises by minimizing the privileges 
gained. 
Minimal privileged code. In GT3, the privileged code 
is confined to small programs, each of which performs a 
specific function and works only with local users, 
accepting no network connections. The simple and well-
constrained functionality of these programs allows them to 
be audited effectively and reduces the chance that they can 
be used maliciously to gain privilege elevation. 
5.3 GT3 GRAM Implementation 
We introduce the GSI3 implementation by describing 
how it is used in GT3’s GRAM [8, 9] system. GRAM is a 
fundamental GT service enabling remote clients to 
instantiate, manage and monitor, in a secure fashion, 
computational tasks (“jobs”) on remote resources. While 
GT3 offers a number of other services (e.g., for file 
movement and monitoring), GRAM is the most 
complicated service in GT3 from a security perspective 
because it provides for the secure, remote, dynamic 
instantiation of processes, involving both secured 
interaction with a remote client and the local operating 
system. 
To invoke a job using GRAM, a client describes the 
job to be run, specifying such details as the name of the 
executable, the working directory, where input and output 
should be stored, and the queue in which it should run. 
This description is sent to the resource and ultimately 
results in the creation of an instance of a Managed Job 
Service (MJS). A MJS is a Grid service that acts as an 
interface to its associated job, instantiating it and then 
allowing it to be controlled and monitored with standard 
Grid and Web service mechanisms. 
An MJS is created by invoking a create operation on a 
MJS factory service. While conceptually we want to run 
one MJS factory service per user account, this approach is 
not ideal in practice because it involves resource 
consumption by factories that sit idle when the user is not 
using the resource. Thus, we introduce an additional 
construct, the Master Managed Job Factory Service 
(MMJFS). One MMJFS runs on each resource, in a non-
privileged account, and invokes Local Managed Job 
Factory Services (LMJFS) for users in their account as 
needed. A service called a Proxy Router routes incoming 
requests from a user to either that user’s LMJFS, if present, 
or the MMJFS, if a LMJFS is not present for the user 
making the request.  
All MJS and MJS factories are implemented as Grid 
services running in a hosting environment. Each active 
account has a hosting environment running for its use, with 
a MJS factory and one or more MJS instances running in 
that hosting environment. This approach allows for the 
creation of multiple services in a lightweight manner. 
Figure 4 shows a requestor initiating a job in the GT3 
GRAM architecture. On the left is the requestor with a set 
of GSI user proxy credentials. The resource, with its 
GRAM services and host credentials, is on the right. Job 
initiation proceeds as follows. 
1. The requestor forms a job description and signs it 
with appropriate GSI credentials. This request is 
sent to the target resource on which process 
initiation is desired. 
2. The Proxy Router service accepts the request and 
either routes it to an LMJFS, if present (skip to 
step 6), or to the MMJFS otherwise (on to step 3). 
3. The MMJFS verifies the signature on the request 
and establishes the identity of the requestor. It 
then determines the local account in which the job 
should be run based on the requestor’s identity 
using the grid-mapfile, a local configuration file 
containing mappings from GSI identities to local 
identities [4].  
4. The MMJFS invokes the Setuid Starter process to 
start a LMJFS for the requestor. The Setuid 
Starter is a privileged program (typically setuid-
root) whose sole function is to start a pre-
configured LMJFS for a user.  
5. When a LMJFS starts, it needs to acquire 
credentials and register itself with the Proxy 
Router. To register, the LMJFS sends a message 
(not shown) to the Proxy Router. This informs the 
Proxy Router of the existence of the LMJFS so 
that it can route future requests for job initiation 
to it. The LMJFS invokes the Grid Resource 
Identity Mapper (GRIM) to acquire a set of 
credentials. GRIM is a privileged program 
(typically setuid-root) that accesses the local host 
credentials and from them generates a set of GSI 
proxy credentials for the LMJFS. This proxy 
credential has embedded in it the user’s Grid 
identity, local account name, and local policy to 
help the requestor verify that the LMJFS is 
appropriate for its needs. 
6. The LMJFS receives the signed job request. The 
LMJFS verifies the signature on the request to 
make sure it has not been tampered with and to 
verify the requestor is authorized to access the 
Figure 4. A requestor initiating a job with the GT3 GRAM 
 system. The steps are described in the text. 
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local user account in which the LMJFS is running. 
Once these verifications are complete, the LMJFS 
invokes an MJS with the job initiation request and 
returns the service reference of the MJS to the 
user.  
7. The requestor connects to the MJS to initiate the 
job. The requestor and MJS perform mutual 
authentication, the MJS using the credentials 
acquired from GRIM. The MJS verifies that the 
requestor is authorized to initiate processes in the 
local account. The requestor authorizes the MJS 
as having a GRIM credential issued from an 
appropriate host credential and containing a Grid 
identity matching its own. This approach allows 
the client to verify that the MJS it is talking to is 
running not only on the right host but also in an 
appropriate account. When making this 
connection, the user also delegates GSI 
credentials to the MJS for the job. 
 
5.4 Implementation Status 
The architecture and features described in Section 5 
are available as part of GT3 [36]. Some of the Web 
services specifications are still in the standards process, 
and we expect the details of our implementation to change 
to track these specifications as they progress 
6 Conclusions 
Grid computing presents a number of security 
challenges that are met by the Globus Toolkit’s Grid 
Security Infrastructure (GSI). Version 3 of the Globus 
Toolkit (GT3) implements the emerging Open Grid 
Services Architecture; its GSI implementation (GSI3) takes 
advantage of this evolution to improve on the security 
model used in earlier versions of the toolkit. GSI3 remains 
compatible (in terms of credential formats) with those used 
in GT2, while eliminating privileged network services and 
making other improvements. Its development provides a 
basis for a variety of future work. In particular, we are 
interested in exploiting WS-Routing to improve firewall 
compatibility; in defining and implementing standard 
services for authorization, credential conversation, identity 
mapping; and in using WS-Policy to automate application 
determination of requirements and location of services that 
meet those requirements. 
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